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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction of the research topic 
My research question is as follows: 
 What are the main differences and similarities between the law of pre-contractual 
 liability in China and Norway? 
Since the political normalization dating back to November 2016, there has been a solid rise in 
business activity between China and Norway.1 The many examples include investments in 
land-based salmon plants,2 various joint venture agreements, a collaboration for developing 
sustainable and green shipping solutions,3 a non-stop flight route between Beijing and Oslo,4 
and the digitalization of China's energy sector.5 Considering the complexity of these matters 
and the agreements governing them, it is safe to assume that they are not results of simple 
offer and acceptance; they are rather a result of careful negotiations, conducted on a step-by-
step basis.  
During such discussions, the parties will often develop expectations towards one another. 
These will sometimes be defined in writing, while they in other cases just occur as a result of 
the interaction. Examples of such common expectations are mutual honesty about 
information vital to the contract, collaboration in order to obtain agreement about disputed 
contract terms, and maintenance of the confidentiality of sensitive information learned in the 
course of the negotiations. This thesis will, firstly, investigate whether these and other 
expectations are protected under various circumstances within Chinese and Norwegian law.  
                                                 
1 China is currently Norway's third most important trading partner behind the European Union (EU) and the 
United States of America (US); Norges viktigste handelspartnere (2018 January 30). Retrieved from 
https://www.ssb.no/utenriksokonomi/artikler-og-publikasjoner/norges-viktigste-handelspartnere 
2 Hageskal, A. (2017, June 26). Har fått tommel opp for norsk lakseproduksjon i Kina. Sysla, Retrieved from 
https://sysla.no/fisk/har-fatt-tommel-opp-norsk-lakseproduksjon-kina 
3 Styrket samarbeid om norsk skipsfart. (2018, October 23). Norges rederiforbund, Retrieved from 
https://rederi.no/aktuelt/2018/statsbesok-kina/ 
4 Olsen, S. (2019, May 16). First non-stop flight arrives in Norway from China. Salmon business, Retrieved 
from https://salmonbusiness.com/first-non-stop-flight-arrives-in-norway-from-china/ 
5 Øyvann, S. (2018, October 17). Konsberg Digital til Alibaba. Computerworld, Retrieved from 
http://www.cw.no/artikkel/siste-nyheter/kongsberg-digital-til-alibaba 
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If a party has become victim of bad faith in negotiations, it will often experience losses as a 
result. When in-person negotiations between companies located in China and Norway are 
taking place, for instance, at least one of the parties will incur travel and accommodation 
costs. If a Norwegian private equity fund is contemplating the acquisition of a Chinese 
business, shared corporate information and business secrets may be unlawfully exploited. A 
Norwegian producer of healthcare technology can invest considerable resources in 
developing customized technology to a Chinese hospital with the aim of concluding a 
lucrative contract. As a result of the expectation that a profitable contract will be won, a 
company may also refuse acceptance of similar offers from third parties. This thesis will also 
investigate if, and in each case how, these and other losses resulting from a pre-contractual 
breach may be remedied under the law of pre-contractual liability in China and Norway. 
To summarize, the two main considerations when assessing the law of pre-contractual 
liability are: 1) which acts or omissions imply liability, and 2) what remedies are there in the 
event of such liability. I will address and discuss both of these issues comparatively. 
Such a comparison is of great interest considering both the increased complexity of 
negotiations and the boosted interaction between China and Norway. Businesses and their 
advisors should have knowledge about the differences and similarities for acceptable conduct 
and remedies for unacceptable conduct. The parties can then better make sure their business 
is conducted in accordance with the applicable law. They may also consider the status of pre-
contractual liability in these legal systems when deciding which law shall govern their 
relationship. 
Further in this introduction, in subchapter 1.2, I will be making clear what will not be 
discussed in this thesis, the delimitations. In subchapter 1.3, I will first place the subject 
matter of the thesis in a wider context and present a more detailed overview of the rules on 
pre-contractual liability in China and Norway. This includes giving an account of the 
historical background of the law in the two countries and defining its place in the legal 
system. Then, in subchapter 1.4, I will give an account for the relevant sources of law and 
applicable legal method. Lastly, I will conclude the introduction part by describing the 
structure of the rest of the thesis. 
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1.2 Delimitations 
Since this thesis concerns the imposition of responsibility at the pre-contractual stage, 
liability arising from situations occurring either before or after this phase, are beyond its 
scope. I will further assume an ordinary party constellation meaning that special 
considerations relating to, for example, bidding law, contracts to which the government is a 
party, or consumer rights will not be pursued. Additionally, in respect of remedies for breach 
of pre-contractual duties, this thesis will be limited to assessing the methods for measuring 
damages and will not comment on how the actual calculation should be carried out.  
I will focus on the differences and similarities as to the practical application of the law of pre-
contractual liability in China and Norway. This means that I will only address the topic of 
this thesis de lege lata and not de lege ferenda. The broad variety to the ways in which a 
party may act in bad faith as well as the limitations set out by the scope of this thesis, 
however, makes it impossible to give a complete outline of all thinkable situations which 
may arise and their potential solutions. I will therefore concentrate on the main features. 
Beyond focusing on the general structure and presenting the starting point, I have chosen to 
compare five different types of situations for illustrating the practical applicability of the 
basis of liability. 
1.3 Further review of the subject matter 
1.3.1 Historical background 
The view as to whether a party enjoys protection before a final contract is concluded has 
traditionally been divided between common and civil law countries. Common law legal 
systems generally take the view that the parties in capacity of private autonomy must enter 
into a formal contract in order for a legal relationship to be created,6 whilst the civil law 
countries emphasize that since the parties engage in a collaborative effort also when they are 
                                                 
6 In the often referred to Walford v Miles case, [1992] 2 AC 128, Lord Ackner described a duty to negotiate in 
good faith to be "as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating 
party". 
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negotiating, they are entitled to legal protection.7 The civil law view is adopted both in 
Chinese law and Norwegian law. 
In China, the principle of pre-contractual liability derives from German law precedents.8 The 
latter obliged a party to act in good faith or to take reasonable care towards the other party in 
the pre-contractual phase.9 This doctrine was developed by the German legal scholar Rudolf 
von Jhering, who wrote about Culpa in Contrahendo in his article from 1861.10 Even though 
von Jhering based his findings on medieval legal science,11 jurisprudence is generally of the 
view that his work has laid the foundation for the development of the law of pre-contractual 
liability as we know it today in most civil law countries. Consequently, the law of pre-
contractual liability within Chinese law shares its roots with most other legal systems.  
Certain provisions of the former PRC Contract law of 1981 and the General Principles of 
Civil law partially accepted the idea of culpa in contrahendo. The current Contract Law of 
the People's Republic of China (CCL)12 also contains provisions on pre-contractual liability 
which bear resemblance to von Jhering's doctrine.13 Moreover, when adopting these 
provisions, the Chinese lawmakers made numerous references to foreign civil law theories 
and international soft law principles such as UNIDROIT, PECL and PICC.14  
Notwithstanding the influence that Western and international legal sources have had on the 
statutory provisions on pre-contractual liability within Chinese law, the doctrine has Chinese 
characteristics. Chinese courts will not consider foreign law when interpreting Chinese law 
and will pay limited regard to international soft law.15 
                                                 
7 John Cartwright & Martijn Hesselink, Precontractual Liability in European Private Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2008), p. 449 ff. 
8 Han Shiyuan, "Culpa in Contrahendo in Chinese Contract law", 6 Tsinghua Law review, 2014 (pp. 157-170) p. 
158. 
9 Li Xiaoyang, "The Legal Status of Pre-Contractual Liability: Contrasting Responses from German and English 
Law", National Taiwan University Law Review Volume 12: 1, 2017 (pp. 127-175) p. 133. 
10 Rudolf von Jhering, "Culpa in contrahendo, oder Schadensersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht zur Perfektion 
gelangten Verträgen", Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Privatrechts, 1861 
Bind 4, 1. 
11 Barbara Pasa, "Pre-contractual Liability from a Civil Lawyer's Perspective". In Larry Dimatteo & Chen Lei, 
Chinese Contract Law: Civil and Common Law Perspectives, 2017 (pp. 160-189) p. 162. 
12 Promulgated 15 March 1999. 
13 Han, p. 158. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Liu Qiao & Ren Xiang, "CISG in Chinese Courts: The Issue of Applicability". In The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, Volume 65, Issue 4, 2017, (pp. 873-918). 
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In Norway, the doctrine has been developed gradually through several Supreme Court 
decisions,16 without reference to legal theories beyond Norwegian borders. The doctrine is 
still likely to have been influenced by similar legal cultures with already developed rules on 
pre-contractual liability.17 
1.3.2 The position of pre-contractual liability in the legal landscape 
In China and Norway, the rules on contract formation, interpretation of contracts, breach of 
contracts and remedies for breach of contracts, are to a large degree the same. They have both 
adopted the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) and have used the Convention as model for certain important laws.18 The CISG does 
not, however, contain rules about the pre-contractual phase. 
Generally, this phase may be defined as the engagement of two or more parties in 
negotiations with the aim of concluding, or at least evaluating the possibility of forming a 
binding contract.19 While it starts when at least one of the parties belief in the existence of a 
mutual will to contract, it ends when the contract is effective in accordance with the rules of 
contract formation. As this represents something in between a non-existing legal relationship 
and a mutually binding contract, legal scholars in both China and Norway have debated 
whether pre-contractual liability should be regarded as part of contract law or general tort 
law.20 In China, pre-contractual liability is a separate doctrine which can function in 
concurrence with general tort and contract law,21 while the Norwegian law of pre-contractual 
liability is a form of special regulation of the culpa norm.22 The latter may, as a result, not 
overlap with tort or contract law.  
Regardless of classification, it is important to recognise that pre-contractual liability contains 
elements of each: contract law because the parties have established a form of legal 
relationship; and tortious liability because the issue in question is whether compensation may 
be imposed for acts or omissions performed outside an established contractual relationship. 
                                                 
16 With the first clear legal basis as late as in year 1992; Rt-1992-1110 (Stiansen judgment), p. 1115. 
17 And among these; German law. 
18 The Norwegian Sale of Goods Act of 1988 and the 1999 Contract Law of the People's Republic of China both 
contains implementations of the CISG. 
19 Lasse Simonsen, Prekontraktuelt ansvar, Oslo 1997, p. 5. 
20 See e.g. Simonsen, p. 164 and Han, p. 165. 
21 Bing, p. 217. 
22 Simonsen, p. 252. 
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Chinese and Norwegian law share the same main requirements for imposing liability both in 
contract and according to general tort law, and these requirements have also been adopted to 
the pre-contractual phase. Firstly, fault, meaning either intent or negligence, is generally 
considered a requirement for imposing pre-contractual liability.23 24 A second common 
requirement is that no compensation may be claimed without any loss suffered, and, lastly, 
there must be a causal link between the loss and the action or omission performed at the 
negotiation stage for liability to be imposed. Remedies are also largely derived from general 
tort law principles, including assessment of damages. 
1.4 Sources of law and legal method25 
1.4.1 Relevant sources of law and legal method in China 
The Chinese legal system is primarily a socialist Civil Law system.26 Statutory law is 
consequently the legal source with highest authority within Chinese law. When assessing 
whether a pre-contractual norm has been breached, the starting point is the CCL, which has 
status as individual law. Individual laws are number two in the statutory hierarchy, first is the 
Constitution. There are however no statutory laws directly applicable to remedying a pre-
contractual breach. 
The highest Court in China is the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China 
(SPC), which has the right to review decisions from all other courts in the jurisdiction.27 The 
role of the SPC is not to clarify or develop general legal rules, but rather to resolve the 
specific legal disputes it hears. Since the courts have heard few cases where pre-contractual 
liability has been claimed, its contribution to the law of pre-contractual liability is limited. 
Furthermore, its decisions do not carry any precedence, meaning that neither the Court itself 
nor lower Courts are legally bound by previous decisions.28 Since the SPC decisions are 
                                                 
23 Simonsen, p. 252. 
24 Ling Bing, Contract Law in China, Hong Kong (2002), p. 214. 
25 The quotations from legal sources in this thesis are all in English. The translations used are provided by 
various sources, and I will refer to the respective source whenever using quotations.  
26 Jiang Dong, "An Introduction to Chinese Legal Culture", in Koch, Skodvin, Sunde, Comparing Legal 
Cultures (pp. 317-358), p. 321. 
27 Ibid, p. 322. 
28 Ibid, p. 337. 
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highly regarded and expresses the current prevailing legal norms, judges will however often 
de facto rule in accordance with SPC decisions.29 30  
The SPC also has the ability to assume the role of legislator. The first method is by passing 
so-called "Judicial Interpretations", which are nationally enforceable interpretations made by 
the SPC comprising detailed rules with general nature. Such Judicial Interpretations are given 
within the area of pre-contractual liability, although limited to very specific circumstances. 
Jiang holds that Judicial Interpretations are "another form of legal rules with general 
nature",31 while Fu is of the view that they are "analogous to legal code".32 
The second method is by selecting Guiding Cases, which are effective judgments from lower 
courts that are considered to be both in accordance with desired legal views and are deemed 
as contributing to jurisprudence beyond statutory law. Such Guiding Cases can be found 
within the area of pre-contractual liability and will be presented in this thesis. It must 
however be highlighted that the SPC itself has not yet expressly commented on the legal 
force of Guiding Cases. The lower courts have been asked to simply "quote the Guiding Case 
as a reason for their adjudication, but not cite it as the basis for their adjudication".33 
According to Jiang, this supports the view that guiding cases are binding de facto but not de 
jure.34 
Beneath the SPC, the trial bodies in the main court hierarchy in descending order of ranking 
are the High People's Court, Intermediate People's Court and Basic People's Court. There are 
a number of cases heard by these courts that concern a claim for pre-contractual liability, but 
their decisions are not recognized as having any normative value. However, if there are no 
other legal sources, I will nonetheless present cases from lower courts. Although their 
judgments do not have status as judicial precedent, these courts consist of trained judges 
whose judicial examination at least offers a contribution to this thesis. 
There are several publications on the law of pre-contractual liability, also in English. 
However, the work of legal scholars does not carry any legal authority either. Since these 
                                                 
29 Liu Nanping "'Legal precedents' with Chinese Characteristics: Published Cases in the Gazette of the Supreme 
People's Court", Journal of Chinese Law 5.1 (1991), (pp. 107-140) p. 108. 
30 Wei Luo & Joan Liu, A Complete Research Guide to the Laws of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 2003, 
p. 4.  
31 Jiang, p. 332 
32 Fu Yulin, "The Chinese Supreme People's Court in Transition". In Van Rhee, Cornelis Hendrik, Fu: Supreme 
Courts in Transition in China and the West, Maastricht 2017, (pp. 13-36) p. 27. 
33 Jiang, p. 332. 
34 Ibid.  
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scholars are highly qualified and specialised academics with the same legal education and 
approaches to legal issues as Chinese judges and, as such, are nonetheless well-suited to 
examine the current law of pre-contractual liability in China, their opinion still offers great 
argumentative value.35 Furthermore, legal theory is very helpful in systematising and 
delivering a comprehensive presentation of legal sources. I will therefore make numerous 
references to legal theory in this thesis, but not dedicate any weight to them as a legal source 
per se. 
As set out above, there are few authoritative legal sources governing the law of pre-
contractual liability in China. On the other hand, there exists a fair amount of cases from 
lower courts as well as publications.  
1.4.2 Relevant sources of law and legal method in Norway 
Statutory law is the highest authority of legal sources within Norwegian law. Since written 
laws often are formulated in a short and discretionary manner, the preparatory work from 
drafting the laws often contains detailed discussions and guidance as to how the law should 
be applied. Although the rules on pre-contractual liability in Norway are non-statutory, 
certain statutory provisions, including their preparatory work, are of significance for this 
assessment.36 
As said, the doctrine of pre-contractual liability has been developed by the Supreme Court, 
who's judgments form precedents, meaning that they are binding on lower courts and the 
court itself.37 There are, however, few cases which have been heard by the Supreme Court 
relating to the issue, and in those cases, pre-contractual liability has always been brought 
before the Court as an alternative claim to the primary claim (that a binding agreement has 
been concluded). As a result, pre-contractual liability often receives less attention in the 
litigation, impacting the clarifications which are offered by the Court. It has therefore been 
left to legal scholars to develop both the width and the depth of the law of pre-contractual 
liability beyond the position as set out in Supreme Court decisions. The most detailed work 
has been conducted by Lasse Simonsen in his book Prekontraktuelt ansvar,38 which will be 
                                                 
35 Meaning that they are only persuasive as opposed to binding. 
36 As will be showed in Chapter 2. 
37 Erik Monsen, Innføring i juridisk metode og oppgaveteknikk (2012), p. 154. 
38 See note 19. 
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referred to extensively in this thesis. The weight of legal theory is however limited to its 
argumentative value and will consequently only be used for this purpose. 
Beneath the Norwegian Supreme Court operate two further, ordinary courts of law. These 
comprise the Appellate Court and District Court, whose decisions do not carry precedents. I 
will refer to certain cases from the Appellate Court in this thesis. 
I will also be referring to certain cases from the Swedish Supreme Court. As far as it 
promotes legal unification, foreign law is a legitimate source for legal reasoning under 
Norwegian law.39 40  
As is the case in China, there are consequently few authoritative sources concerning the 
Norwegian doctrine of pre-contractual liability. Prekontraktuelt ansvar by Lasse Simonsen 
however constitutes a thorough and comprehensive presentation of the subject matter.  
1.5 Further structure 
Proceeding with this thesis, I will firstly investigate the differences and similarities between 
the scope of liability within Chinese and Norwegian law (chapter 2). In that part, I will first 
highlight the main considerations behind imposing liability for bad faith behaviour. Then, I 
will present the general starting point for assessing the scope of liability within the respective 
jurisdictions before I focus on specific types of situations. I will discuss particularly the 
boundary between accepted negotiation tactics and a duty to disclose relevant information or 
provide truthful information, the boundary between what information received in the course 
of the negotiation that may be shared or exploited and not, and whether the existence of a 
preliminary agreement makes any difference to acceptable behaviours during negotiation of a 
contract.  
In the following chapter, I will go on to consider the rules on remedies for liability (chapter 
3). Issues that will be discussed include whether remedies can be claimed only in the shape of 
monetary compensation, if the aggrieved party can claim reliance damages, expectation 
damages or both, and whether both direct and indirect losses are recoverable. 
                                                 
39 Ibid p. 45. 
40 Rt-1994-1584, p. 1587. 
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Chapter 4 will consist of a presentation of aspects of Chinese law that are fundamental to 
consider in order to conduct a meaningful analysis of how the law of pre-contractual liability 
in China is to be understood in practice. Here, I will show how unpredictable dispute 
resolution in China is and highlight aspects of Chinese culture that prevent parties from going 
to court with a claim for pre-contractual liability. 
In addition to the consecutive comparison of the various types of situations in chapter 2 and 
the comparative summary at the end of chapter 3, I will also include a chapter 5, in which I 
summarise my comparative findings. 
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2 Scope of liability 
2.1 The balancing of freedom of contract and pre-
contractual liability 
The principle of freedom of contract is a valued concept in most modern legal systems and 
dictates that contracts are based on a mutual agreement and freedom of choice. Although 
Chinese law does not formally contain the principle of freedom of contract, the right to enter 
into contracts voluntarily as set out in Article 4 of the CCL has generally been understood as 
freedom do decide whether to conclude a contract, with whom to contract, and the terms and 
the form of the contract.41 Unlike traditional freedom of contract, the right must be exercised 
"according to law".42 In comparison, the Norwegian operates with the principle of freedom of 
contract and the delimitations of this right must be provided by law.43 In Chinese law, 
however, Bing holds that the "substantive rights recognised under the principle of 
voluntariness is almost identical to those under the conventional notion of freedom of 
contract".44  
The abovementioned principles also imply that a party has the freedom not to contract. Since 
imposition of liability at the negotiation stage only becomes relevant when one of the parties 
is unwilling to enter into the contract in question, pre-contractual liability stands in direct 
conflict with the principle of freedom of contract. The greater the scope of liability, the more 
the principle of freedom of contract becomes restricted. In shaping the rules on pre-
contractual liability, a balance, therefore, must be struck between protecting the parties to a 
negotiation from becoming victims of one side's bad faith one the one side and respecting the 
fact that the parties have not bound themselves to a contractual agreement on the other. When 
finding the balance between party autonomy and negotiation strategies that are harmful and 
unwanted, multiple considerations must be made. If freedom to negotiate without subsequent 
liability were very limited, businesses may refrain from becoming involved with prospective 
collaborative partners. Such lack of economic activity would be detrimental to any market 
                                                 
41 Bing, p. 43. 
42 Translation by Bing, p. 42. 
43 Geir Woxholth, Avtalerett, 10th edititon, Oslo 2017, p. 27. 
44 Bing, p. 43. 
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economy. On the other hand, businesses could also refrain from negotiating a contract if they 
are not secured against losses in reliance upon a future contract being concluded. The 
optimum is therefore if the rules on pre-contractual liability are balanced in a way that 
ensures the needs of both parties to the negotiations are met pursuant to the prevailing 
business norms in their area of practice and the values of the legal system in which they 
operate. When the rules are adjusted to the common perception in this way, negotiating 
parties will experience them as predictable. This will lead to more transactions taking place, 
which is desired in a market economy. 
From a socioeconomic perspective, the aim should be to waste as little created value as 
possible. If four architect firms are requested to develop a custom-made sketch for a building 
project, each with their individual belief that they are the only one asked but with only one of 
the four eventually chosen, the three others will have wasted their resources without 
contributing to market growth or development. This principle therefore suggests that pre-
contractual liability should be imposed in such cases. 
The role of legal regulation is, in many ways, to reflect the social culture and the specific area 
of life that it concerns. Therefore, in defining both the general legal basis for pre-contractual 
liability and handling specific cases, the principle of fairness should also be considered. 
2.2 The starting point for the liability assessment 
In Chinese law, the general standard for behaviour at the negotiation stage is that it must be in 
accordance with "good faith", as set out in Article 42 (3) of the CCL. Since this broad standard 
to a limited degree has been specified in authoritative legal sources, it is difficult to predict how 
it will be applied in various types of situations. 
Bing however highlights that the key test when assessing whether a particular behaviour 
breaches the good faith principle, is "whether the defendant's behaviour falls below what is 
expected of a reasonable person on the basis of the moral, social and commercial standards of 
conduct prevailing in the community concerned".45 The SPC further held in the case of 
Xingye Global Fund Management Co. Ltd. v Jiangsu Rongsheng Heavy Industry Co. Ltd46 
that the nature and purpose of the contract in question and the relevant usage of the 
                                                 
45 Ibid. p. 217. 
46 (2013) Min Shen Zi No. 1881. 
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transaction must be taken into consideration when defining the specific content of a pre-
contractual obligation.47 
Certain types of situations have been regulated separately; Article 42 (1) provides that bad 
faith-negotiations in the pretext of concluding a contract will amount to liability and Article 
42 (2) holds accountable a party that either conceals a material fact relevant to the conclusion 
of a contract or that provides false information. Further, Article 43 of the CCL establishes 
that negotiating parties may not disclose or improperly use trade secrets learned in the course 
of negotiations. All the mentioned situations are regulated separately because they are 
considered to be of practical importance and automatically constitute a breach of the good 
faith standard, whilst circumstances which fall outside of these Articles are subject to the 
good faith-test as set out in the catch-all provision of Article 42 (3).  
In Norway, the rules on pre-contractual liability are part of the broader doctrine of the Duty of 
Loyalty in Contractual Relationships. The Supreme Court has, as said, only delivered a few 
judgments where compensation for a pre-contractual breach was claimed. The Court has 
however generally expressed, in respect of pre-contractual liability, that "(…)the basis is that 
a blameworthy behaviour must have been exercised in the course of the negotiations – 
disloyalty, dishonesty, inducement or the like".48 49 This formulation coincides with the view 
promulgated in legal literature; that the standard for becoming liable at the pre-contractual 
stage is a form of special regulation of the culpa norm.50 This involves that the parties, within 
the respective area of life in which they operate, must act as would a reasonable person of 
ordinary prudence have done.51 
Simonsen further holds that general factors that should be considered when deciding whether 
or not a party is at fault when negotiating comprise: (i) who the parties are; (ii) the 
commercial relationship between them; (iii) the extent of the negotiations; and (iv) the type of 
investments made.52  
                                                 
47 Ding Chunyan, "The Doctrine of Precontractual Liability under Chinese Law: A Comparative Outlook". In 
European Review of Private law 27 (3) (2019) pp. 1-30, p. 4. 
48 Rt-1998-761, p. 772. 
49 My translation. 
50 Simonsen, p. 252. 
51 For a nuanced discussion of which standard a person according to general tort law is expected to live up to, 
see Viggo Hagstrøm & Are Stenvik, Erstatningsrett, Oslo (2015), pp. 68-71. 
52 Simonsen, p. 162. 
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Chinese and Norwegian law consequently coincides by requiring fault for liability to be 
imposed. Furthermore, both jurisdictions recognize that which expectations towards a party's 
behaviour that is legitimate depends on general factors such as the community the transaction 
takes place in and the nature of the transaction.  
Concerning the type of situations that now will be presented in subchapters 2.3-2.7, it is 
important to note that fault, meaning either intent or negligence, is a general requirement for 
demonstrating a basis of liability under both Chinese and Norwegian law. 
2.3 Negotiating without a genuine intent to contract 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Businesses sometimes enter into negotiations despite having no intention of concluding a 
final contract. The negotiations are instead used as a pretext for the purpose of, for example, 
obtaining private information from the opposite party or frustrating its attempt to enter into a 
contract with a competitor. This part will assess whether, and if so on what grounds, 
negotiating without a genuine intent to contract results in liability within Chinese and 
Norwegian law. 
2.3.2 Chinese law 
Article 42 (1) of the CCL imposes liability on a party who "negotiates in bad faith under the 
pretext of concluding a contract".53 
The wording "pretext" refers to the situation where the defendant uses the negotiations for an 
ulterior motive without having any real intention to conclude a contract. The defendant's 
extended negotiations with the aggrieved party which do not result in an agreement, are 
consequently, not in themselves sufficient to impose liability under this Article.54  
In assessing any alleged pretexts for bad faith, there will likely be significant challenges in 
attempting to prove any alleged malicious intention. However, the defendant’s overall 
                                                 
53 Translated by Bing, p. 214.  
54 Bing, p. 216. 
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behaviour in the negotiations will function as circumstantial evidence in this regard. 
Examples include insistence on unreasonable terms, capricious reversal on previous 
positions, persistent requests for irrelevant information and unjustified delays in responding.55 
Importantly, there is neither a requirement that the defendant had any intention to cause loss 
to the aggrieved party nor that the aggrieved party identified the defendant's motivations in 
negotiating without intent to form a contract.56 The absence of such intent and a loss thereby 
caused, is sufficient. 
2.3.3 Comparison with Norwegian law 
The Supreme Court of Norway has yet to resolve a case concerning the situation where a 
party negotiates without a genuine intention to enter into a contract. The view in legal theory 
is however that liability should be imposed in such situations.57 This rule accords with the 
values upon which the statutory provisions on fraud are based,58 as well as the principle of 
fairness. Even though there is no authoritative legal source dictating this situation, the 
mentioned arguments combined provides a secure legal basis for liability.  
As such, in respect of negotiations in bad faith where there is an underlying pretext to the 
conclusion of the contract, Chinese and Norwegian law are congruent in that they both 
impose liability for such behaviour. It is neither a requirement that the liable party had an 
intention to cause a loss or that the motivation behind his acts is identified within any of the 
legal systems. 
The practical challenges incumbent upon proofing that the defendant lacked such an intention 
to enter into an agreement, are also congruent in both legal systems. In any case in which 
there is a deficiency of clear evidence, the question of liability must be considered against the 
other rules of pre-contractual liability. These are generally based on more objective standards 
and thus do not contain the same challenges in terms of proof. 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ding, p. 5.  
57 Simonsen, p. 196. 
58 Article 30 of Norway's Contract Act of 1918. 
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2.4 Concealing material facts or providing false 
information 
2.4.1 Introduction 
It is particularly important to be well informed when negotiating a contract. Sometimes one 
of the parties experiences losses as a result of the opposing party concealing information or 
providing false information relevant to the contract. This part will investigate if liability may 
be imposed in such circumstances. 
2.4.2 Chinese law 
According to Article 42 (2) of the CCL, he who in the course of concluding a contract 
"intentionally conceals a material fact relevant to the conclusion of the contract or gives false 
information"59 is liable. It is important to note that the scope of the article is limited to 
intentional acts. 
The wording "material" restricts the scope of concealed information to that which is 
considered important. In the SPC case Xingye Global Fund Management Co. Ltd. v Jiangsu 
Rongsheng Heavy Industry Co. Ltd.,60 the court applied the general principle of good faith 
when interpreting which concealed facts that are comprised of the term, and held that the 
specific content of the obligation must be determined in conjunction with the nature and 
purpose of the contract in question and the relevant usage of the transaction.61 Bing further 
provides guidance to the assessment by stating that what should be regarded as "material" 
depends on the nature and purpose of the negotiations and the parties' intentions.62 
Article 42 (2) is absolute in stipulating that all kind of provision of false information results 
in liability. However, even though the above mentioned SPC case concerned concealment of 
information rather than the provision of false information, it is submitted that the 
methodological approach applied therein would likely be the same in the latter; Article 42 (2) 
is a casuistic reflection of the good faith-standard in Article 42 (3) and should therefore be 
                                                 
59 Translated by Bing, p. 214. 
60 (2013) Min Shenzi No. 1881 
61 Ding, p. 4. 
62 Bing, p. 217. 
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applied with a view to the standard. Provision of information that is considered to be within 
the norms of negotiation tactics must therefore be accepted even if it is untrue. Liability may 
normally not be imposed, for instance, if a party provides false information by saying that it 
has given its "best and final offer". Where the line should be struck between acceptable and 
unacceptable provision of false information of such character, is however difficult to 
demarcate. 
In case in which a contract is concluded subsequent to the provision of false information or a 
non-disclosure comprised by Article 42 (2), the paragraph is still applicable. This means that 
the innocent party may be able to confirm the voidable contract and still claim pre-contractual 
liability.63 
In case of negligent non-disclosure of material information or misrepresentation, Article 42 
(2) is not applicable, but such conduct may very well violate the principle of good faith in 
Article 42 (3). In the case Beijing Zhongrui Cultural Dissemination Ltd. v Beijing Lingdian 
Market Investigation and Analysis Co.,64 rendered by Beijing Second Intermediate People's 
Court, the defendant became liable for negligent non-disclosure of an existing trade usage 
and the plaintiff's option to "buy out" the investigation service in question. The defendant was 
a professional market investigator well aware of the mentioned usage of trade.65 
2.4.3 Comparison with Norwegian law 
As is the case under Chinese law, the general basis in Norway is that liability shall be 
imposed upon a party in which provides false information or conceals information relevant to 
the contract.66  
It is submitted that also Norwegian law contains a threshold for liability to be established. 
Regarding terms upon which a party is willing to contract when negotiating a contract, for 
example, the appellate court has said that the "clear basis is that a party does not have a duty 
to inform the opposite party about tactical and commercial considerations during the 
                                                 
63 Bing, p. 217. 
64 SPC Gazette, 1999, No. 3 p. 100. 
65 Bing, p. 219. 
66 Simonsen, p. 181. 
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negotiations".67 68 While this basis seems reasonable, the exact line between tactical and 
commercial considerations and information which goes beyond that, is naturally difficult to 
draw. Based on two orders from the Swedish Supreme Court,69 it is further held by Simonsen 
that a party may be obliged to inform the other about conditions of significance for the 
probability that a contract will come to be.70  
More generally, he holds that, when assessing the legal boundaries for acceptable lies or 
concealment of information, a view must be taken as to the prevailing norms in the specific 
business community where the transaction takes place and the relationship between the 
parties in question.71 The topic of assessment is thus similar to that of Chinese law, since the 
mentioned considerations is inherent to the good faith assessment. Even though the 
assessment is the same, there may, however, still be differences in the result of the 
assessment within Chinese and Norwegian law since the view of what behaviour is 
'acceptable' in each country during negotiations is likely to be different.72  
In case facts relevant to the conclusion of the contract are concealed or false information 
provided, the Norwegian doctrine of pre-contractual liability is not applicable after a contract 
has been entered into, which represents a systematic difference compared to Chinese law. 
Under Norwegian law, such a claim must be pursued according to the general rules of 
contract law. Even though the two legal systems operate with systematically different 





                                                 
67 LF-2005-28854 (Frostating). The case was reviewed by the Supreme Court, who considered a binding 
agreement to exist and therefore did not comment on this issue. 
68 My translation. 
69 NJA 1990 s. 745 and NJA 1978 147. 
70 Simonsen, p. 192-193. 
71 Simonsen, p. 219. 
72 Due to the features highlighted in chapter 4. 
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2.5 Protection of confidential information 
2.5.1 Introduction 
When negotiating a contract, information of a confidential nature is sometimes shared. This 
part examines the circumstances in which a party who learns about such information has a 
duty to refrain from disclosing or exploiting it.  
2.5.2 Chinese law 
Without regards to the specific nature of the information, if a party receives information on 
the condition that it shall not be disclosed or in other ways exploited, failure to fulfil this 
promise will result in liability.73  
According to Article 43 of the CCL, “Whether or not the contract is concluded, trade secrets 
learnt by a party in the course of the conclusion of the contract shall not be disclosed or 
improperly used. A party who discloses or improperly uses such trade secrets, thereby 
causing damage to the other party, shall bear liability for compensation”.74 
“Trade secrets” is not defined in the CCL, but the definition of the same term in Article 9 (3) 
of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of 2019 is commonly adopted.75 According to the 
Article, "trade secrets" refer to “technical information or business information which is 
unknown to the public, can bring about economic benefits to the entitled person, has practical 
utility and in respect of which the entitled person has taken measures to protect its secrecy”.76  
According to a Judicial Interpretation given by the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC),77 the wording “unknown to the public” means that the information cannot 
be directly obtained through public channels.78 SAIC's interpretations further hold that the 
measure the aggrieved party must have taken to protect the secrecy, may be “the conclusion 
                                                 
73 As will be explained in chapter 2.6, such behaviour constitutes a contractual breach. 
74 Translated by Bing, p. 220. 
75 Bing, p. 220 refers to the formerly prevailing Anti-Unfair Competition Law of 1993 Article 10 and Article 9 
(3) of the current law is fully corresponding. 
76 Translated by Bing, p. 220. 
77 Certain Rules on the Prohibition of Infringement of Trade Secrets, Law Collection, 1995 supplement, p. 1266, 
art. 2 (5). 
78 Bing, p. 221. 
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of secrecy agreements, the establishment of systems for the protection of the secrecy and 
other reasonable measures for protecting the secrecy”.79 “Other reasonable measures” is in 
turn interpreted as including requests for confidentiality by the entitled person to employees 
and business partners.80 In the case Beijing Siweige-Taide Electronic Engineering Co. v 
Beijing Yinlan Science & Technology Co. and Others,81 82 rendered by Beijing Haidian 
People's Court, the Court was however of the view that signing Confidentiality Agreements 
with clients not necessarily is required. The Court ruled that the business in question had 
taken reasonable measures by denying clients access to the substance of a certain technology 
the company delivered, concluding Confidentiality Agreements with its employees and 
strengthening the internal management of its organization.83  
If intentional or negligent infringement of trade secrets results in heavy losses for the entitled 
person, fines or imprisonment may be imposed in accordance with Article 219 of the 1997 
Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China. There are also several laws that imposes 
liability in case of infringement of Intellectual Property Rights.84 
2.5.3 Comparison with Norwegian law 
Where the parties have expressly agreed that specific information given in the course of the 
negotiations may not be shared or taken advantage of, breach of that agreement would 
constitute pre-contractual liability also under Norwegian law.85 
Where no such agreement exists, a duty to respect the secrecy of certain information may be 
based on the Duty of Loyalty in Contractual Relationships. The standard on "good business 
practice"86 as laid down in the 2009 Marketing Practices Act Article 25, is considered a form 
of special regulation that defines the content of the Duty of Loyalty within the area of trade 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
80 SAIC Reply to the Question Concerning the Constituent Elements of Trade Secrets (1998), Gong Shang 
Gong, (1998), No. 109 – Bing Ling p. 221 note 679. 
81 SPC Gazette, 1998, p. 107. 
82 The case is a Guiding Case. 
83 Bing, p. 221. 
84 Such as the 2008 Patent Law of the People's Republic of China Article 60 and the 2010 Copyright Law of the 
People's Republic of China Article 47. 
85 Simonsen, p. 189. 
86 My translation. 
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secrets.87 This involves a general duty of confidentiality, where both parties must be able to 
share certain information in confidence that it will not be spread further.88 
The formulation in the general regulation of professional secrecy as laid down in Article 13 
of the 1967 Public Administration Act, is also considered to provide usable guidance in 
defining the scope of the duty of confidentiality when such non-disclosure is not expressly 
agreed upon.89 90 According to the Article, besides "technical arrangements and methods", 
this will include "operating and business conditions that is of competitive signification to 
keep secret".91 The preparatory work states that there is a requirement that the information is 
unknown to the public and unavailable through public channels. Furthermore, the information 
must according to the same source be of significance, and of such a character that it appears 
natural to assume that it is considered to be a secret within the concerned field of business.92 
Thus, Chinese and Norwegian law have a similar comprehension of the types of information 
which enjoy protection in the pre-contractual phase. Both technical and commercial 
information is considered to be in the core of what is protected in both legal systems. Both 
countries also concur in what they consider to be a "secret" regarding such as information 
that is not directly obtainable through public channels.  
As set out above, Chinese law contains an additional requirement that the plaintiff must have 
taken measures to protect the secrecy of the information. If such measures are not taken, the 
information is not considered a trade secret despite the other criteria being fulfilled. There is 
however reason to believe that such a difference will not be of great significance in practice. 
In the above case from Chinese law, the measures considered sufficient in keeping the 
information secret, such as withholding the secret information from clients, concluding 
secrecy agreements with employees and having an acceptable internal management in the 
organization, are acts which would normally be carried out, as matter of course, in respect of 
information that a party wished to keep confidential.  
                                                 
87 Simonsen, p. 190. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 If Article 13 of the Public Administration Act is applied directly, remedies for breach include fines and 
imprisonment, see Article 209 of the 2005 Criminal Act. Such harsh remedies result in stricter requirements for 
imposing liability, and the threshold for becoming liable is therefore expected to be lower when it comes to pre-
contractual situations where compensation is the only potential remedy, see Simonsen, p. 190. 
91 My translation. 
92 Ot.prp. nr. 3 (1976-1977) p. 22. 
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Congruent with Chinese law, obtaining of business secrets during negotiations in the way 
contemplated by Norway's Criminal Act of 2005 Article 208, may be punished with fines and 
imprisonment. There are also statutory rules that impose liability for infringement of various 
Intellectual Property Rights which may be applied at the negotiation stage.93  
2.6 Breach of preliminary agreements 
2.6.1 Introduction 
In this part, I will focus on situations in which the parties have reduced a common 
understanding for acceptable behaviour when negotiating in writing, typically specifying 
what already is agreed upon, what remains, and how further negotiations will be carried out. 
In other words, this represents an incomplete agreement or an agreement to agree. The most 
common of such pre-contracts are a Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Understanding. 
2.6.2 Chinese law 
The legal consequences of a written pre-contract must be considered against the good faith-
test in Article 42 (3). In the Supreme People's Court Interpretation Concerning the 
Application of Law in the Trial of Cases of Disputes over Sales and Purchase Contracts94 
Article 2, a "pre-contract" is essentially recognised as a partial agreement, and is, according 
to case law and legal literature, binding.95  
The fact that pre-contracts are binding does not however mean that liability will be imposed 
if the parties fail to conclude a contract. Even though discretionary terms must be complied 
with in the sense that they are binding, the parties will often have a considerable freedom 
before such standards are breached. For instance, if a preliminary agreement contains a clause 
stating that each of the parties must make "best efforts" towards reaching an agreement but 
the negotiation fails after a whole-hearted attempt from both sides, liability will not be 
imposed. On the other hand, details of a specific nature will generally be considered as 
                                                 
93 Such as the 2018 Copyright Act Article 81 and the 1967 Patent Act Article 58. 
94 Promulgated on 10 May 2012 and effective as of 1 July 2012. 
95 Shen Wei, Liability Prior to Contract Formation in Chinese Contract Law. In Larry DiMatteo & Lei Chen 
(eds) Chinese Contract Law: Civil and Common Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2017), Chapter 6, 
pp. 137-159, p. 141. 
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binding. Among other things, this included provisions dealing with confidentiality, 
exclusivity, governing law, and dispute resolution.96 
Another example of how a preliminary agreement may have independent contractual status 
for the purposes of assessing liability at the negotiation stage, can be found in the mentioned 
SPC Interpretation. If the parties agree that a sale and purchase contract will be entered into 
within a certain period in the future and one of them fails to perform the obligation of 
entering into the contract in question, the court shall uphold any claim stating that the 
breaching party must assume liability for the violation of the pre-contract.97  
When deciding whether certain terms in a written pre-contract have been agreed in such a 
way that they are binding, Chinese courts will take a holistic approach with regards to the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction as well as business common sense and usage.98  
2.6.3 Comparison with Norwegian law 
According to the Supreme Court of Norway, the fundamental principle is that a preliminary 
agreement is binding as far as it ranges.99 The parties can thereby, also under Norwegian law, 
specify certain terms with binding effect before they conclude the final contract.  
Vague terms in preliminary agreements may very well also affect the threshold for becoming 
liable.100 Because the protected interest, which is the reason for imposing liability at the pre-
contractual stage, within Norwegian law is the trust between the parties,101 the relevant 
principle for assessing whether a pre-contract is binding, is what reasonable expectations the 
pre-contract gives the parties rather than the fact that a pre-contract formally has been entered 
into.102 If two parties conclude a preliminary agreement containing vague formulations that 
do not impose more duties on the parties than those already imposed by the Duty of Loyalty 
in Contractual Relationships, this, consequently, will not in itself affect the threshold for 
liability. However, the expectations of loyalty from the opposite party may become 
                                                 
96 Hua Zhang, Remedies for Breach of Preliminary Contract, Journal of Law Application (2019), Issue 2. 
97 Shen, p. 146. 
98 Patrick Zheng & Charles Qin, Llinks Dispute Resolution Bulletin; Chinese Supreme Court Rules on Letter of 
Intent, p. 3. Retrievable from http://www.llinkslaw.com/uploadfile/publication/71_1554083384.pdf 
99 Rt-1992-1110 (Stiansen judgment), p. 1114.  
100 Ibid., p. 244. 
101 Ibid., p. 171. 
102 Ibid., and the Swedish case NJA 1990 s. 745. 
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augmented as a result merely of the existence of an agreement to negotiate.103 The 
significance of such an agreement depends on the degree of formality, the level of detail in 
the agreement and the phase of the negotiations,104 and Norwegian courts will consequently 
also take a holistic approach when assessing whether a pre-contract imposes further duties on 
the parties. 
The position of Chinese law towards whether the threshold for becoming liable might be 
lowered as a result of such vague terms being defined in writing, is uncertain. It is submitted 
that the threshold will become lowered as the formation of a written pre-contract proves that 
the parties are conscious of their duties towards each other.  
Even if the existence of a written agreement generally will result in a lower threshold for 
becoming liable within both of the legal systems, there might however be differences as to 
how the threshold is affected.  
2.7 Duty to apply for approval or registration 
2.7.1 Introduction 
Sometimes the content of a final contract that is entered into cannot be performed without an 
approval or registration from the authorities. Being well aware of such requirements, parties 
tend to agree that one of them holds responsibility for going through with the application. 
Here, the question will be whether failure to apply for such approval or registration may 
result in liability under the law of pre-contractual liability within Chinese and Norwegian 
law. 
2.7.2 Chinese law 
The issue of whether this situation is affected by the standard of "good faith" in Article 42 
(3), was addressed by the SPC in the 2009 Interpretation II on Several Issues concerning the 
Application of the Contract Law of the People's Republic of China105 Article 8. It stated that: 
                                                 
103 Ibid. p. 362. 
104 Ibid., p. 244. 
105 Promulgated on April 4 2009 and effective as of May 13 2009. 
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 "After the formation of a contract which does not become effective until it is approved 
 or registered under a relevant law or administrative regulation, if the party which has 
 the obligation to apply to go through the approval or registration formalities fails to do 
 so under the relevant law or contractual provisions, such failure shall fall within the 
 scope of "taking any other act contrary to the principle of good faith", and the people's 
 court may, as the case may be, and upon the request of the opposite party, rule that 
 the opposite party shall go through the relevant formalities by itself. However, the 
 other party shall be liable for compensating the opposite party for the expenses 
 incurred thereof and the losses actually caused to the opposite party."106 
The interpretation provides that failure to apply for approval or registration constitutes breach 
of a pre-contractual duty even though such failure occurs after the conclusion of a final 
contract. The same legal rule was endorsed in the SPC case of Guangzhou Xianyuan Real 
Estate Co. vs Guangdong Zhongda Zhongxin Investment Planning Co.107 
2.7.3 Comparison with Norwegian law 
If two parties enter into a contract and agree that one of them has to apply for approval or 
registration, the party that fails to do so will breach its contractual duties. The situation will 
therefore be remedied in accordance with the rules of general contract law, meaning that no 
pre-contractual liability may be imposed. Even though the two legal systems operate with 
systematically different approaches, liability of similar nature will be imposed under both set 
of rules. 
 
                                                 
106 Translated by Han, p. 162. 
107 SPC Gazette, 2010, No. 8, p. 27. 
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3 Remedies for pre-contractual liability 
3.1 Introduction 
A party that is negotiating a contract has two separate interests; one a positive, and the other 
negative. The positive interest is the situation the party would have been placed had the 
contract been concluded and fulfilled. This is generally termed the expectation interest. The 
negative interest is the position the aggrieved party would have enjoyed had he never entered 
into negotiations with the breaching party, a concept widely known as the reliance interest. 
As will be shown below, it is mainly the reliance interest that can be claimed for losses 
occurred at the pre-contractual stage. The objection against allowing the expectation interest 
to be covered at the negotiation stage, is the conflict it creates with the general rules of 
contract law. The expectation interest can be compensated for in the event a contract is 
breached and allowing compensation for pre-contracts to the same extent as that of an already 
concluded contract, creates disharmony within this legal field.  
This part will examine which remedies that may be claimed when a pre-contractual 
obligation is breached. The two general categories of remedies – legal and equitable – are 
both relevant concerning pre-contractual liability in China and Norway. In the category of 
legal remedies are damages. In the category of equitable remedies relevant to this assessment 
are specific performance and restitution. Both within Chinese and Norwegian law, 
compensation is the main type of remedy and will hence receive the greatest focus 
(subchapters 3.2 and 3.4). I will however also comment on the mentioned equitable remedies 
(subchapters 3.3 and 3.5). 
3.2 Compensation for damages under Chinese law 
3.2.1  Reliance damages 
The Articles regarding pre-contractual liability in China solely focus on the circumstances in 
which liability may arise, and not the nature and assessment of the size of compensation. 
Both legal scholars and judges are however in consensus that the wording "compensation for 
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damages"108 in Article 42 of the CCL refers to the aggrieved party's reliance interest and not 
its expectation interest.109 The aggrieved party consequently has the right to be put into the 
same financial position it would have been in had the breach of the pre-contractual obligation 
not occurred. This includes out-of-pocket expenses in connection with preparing negotiations, 
conducting negotiations and evaluating the suggestions and proposals of the opposite party.  
Generally, causation between the breach of the pre-contractual obligation and the loss 
suffered must be proven. Chinese courts have however, in certain situations, deviated from 
this principle by offering compensation for expenses that would be experienced without 
regard to the pre-contractual breach. In the case of Shandong Binzhou Jiangong Jituan Co. 
Ltd. v Binzhoushi Binchengqu Weishengju Weishengjiandusuo,110 rendered by the 
Intermediate People's Court of Binzhou City of Shandong Province, the defendant withdrew 
from the negotiations without justification and the Court decided that he had to compensate 
for the loss of the plaintiff, including the bidding costs. Since this expense would be incurred 
regardless of the pre-contractual breach, the case is an example of how compensation for 
breach of a pre-contractual obligation may be extended beyond the reliance cost. 
Another exception to the main rule that the reliance interests may be recovered, is that only 
losses that were reasonably foreseen at the time of the pre-contractual breach are 
recoverable.111  
According to some decisions, a further possible modification of the main rule is that the 
reliance damages may not exceed the size of the expectation interest,112 and some Chinese 
scholars advocate this position.113 The reason for this is that the plaintiff in such a case would 
have entered a losing bargain had the contract been concluded, and allowing full 
compensation for the reliance is considered to be a way of permitting the aggrieved party to 
shift his losses towards the defendant.114 Ding is of the view that the legal basis for this 
opinion is dubious,115 and because of the disagreement between courts and legal scholars, the 
                                                 
108 Translated by Ding, p. 14. 
109 Ding, p. 14. 
110 (2017) Lu 16 Min Zhong No. 1410. 
111 Ding, p. 15. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Han, p. 167 
114 Ibid., p. 168. 
115 Ding, p. 15. 
I_2657553_V3  03.06.19 
current law relating to the question of whether the reliance interest may exceed the 
expectation interest within Chinese law appears to be uncertain. 
Expected profit upon full performance of the contract – the expectation interest – is under no 
circumstances possible to be compensated for, and will, therefore, not be discussed further in 
this subsection.  
3.2.2 Indirect loss 
Beyond losses of direct character, such as expenses related to the preparation of the 
performance of the contract and travel costs in connection with negotiations, Chinese courts 
have also allowed for indirect loss to be covered. Concerning pre-contractual liability, this 
refers to lost gain as a result of loss of opportunity to contract with a third party or making 
alternative investments. Although Chinese courts are split in relation to whether indirect 
losses are covered, the prevailing judicial view is in favour of recoverability of such loss.116 
An example is the case of Xia v Ren and Li,117 rendered by the Intermediate People's Court of 
Jining City of Shandong Province, where the plaintiff, as a result of the defendant's breach of 
a pre-contractual obligation, lost an opportunity to spend RMB 33 000 to purchase real estate. 
19 years later, the value of that property had increased to RMB 1.49 million, and the court 
awarded as much as 1.33 million in damages for lost opportunity.  
It is however worth mentioning that another court reached the opposite result in a case with 
similar facts. Therein the court simply stated that the scope of recoverable damages does not 
include indirect loss caused by breach of a pre-contractual obligation.118 This deviation can 
probably be explained by the factors that will be presented in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
3.2.3 Comparative fault 
Whether liability may be reduced as a result of a contributory fault from the aggrieved party, 
is not regulated in Article 42 of the CCL. Although often failing to mention the legal basis for 
it,119 Chinese courts generally consider comparative fault when determining the amount of 
                                                 
116 Ding, p. 15.  
117 (2017) Lu 08 Min Zhong No. 4635. 
118 Ding, p. 16. 
119 Sometimes Article 58 of the CCL is applied by analogy. 
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damages for pre-contractual liability. This can for instance be based on the plaintiff´s failure 
to mitigate the loss after becoming aware of the pre-contractual breach of the defendant.120  
The correct approach in deciding each party's apportionment of damages incurred by the 
other is to first determine the respective losses of each party and then the proportion of 
liability of each party towards the other party's losses.121 
3.3 Equitable remedies under Chinese law 
3.3.1 Substituted Specific Performance 
An exception to the general position that only the reliance interest may be recovered is 
contained in the situation envisaged at subchapter 2.7, namely when one of the parties has a 
duty to apply for approval or registration and fails to do so. In that case, the aggrieved party 
is, under Article 8 of the Interpretation II, not only entitled to compensation, but may also 
request that the aggrieved party goes through with the procedure himself as "substituted 
specific performance".122 The legal effect is equivalent to that of specific performance, which 
orders the breaching party to satisfy the formality requirement for performance of the 
contract. 
3.3.2 Unjust enrichment 
Where a party illegitimately takes advantage of such confidential information as discussed in 
subchapter 2.5, the aggrieved party may, in addition to claiming compensation for reliance 
loss according to Article 43, be entitled to the profits derived by the infringer as a result of 
the infringement.123 Furthermore, compensation can be claimed for reasonable expenses 
related to investigating the infringer's unfair competition acts that have violated the lawful 
rights or interests of the infringed business.124 
                                                 
120 Ding, p. 17. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Translated by Han, p. 162. 
123 E.g. Article 17 of the 2019 Anti-Unfair Competition Law. 
124 Ibid. 
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3.4 Compensation for damages under Norwegian law 
3.4.1 Reliance damages 
In Norway, compensation for pre-contractual liability is often filed as an alternative claim to 
the primary claim that the parties have entered into a contract. In none of the few cases 
adjudged by the Supreme Court concerning pre-contractual liability, has a claim for 
compensation on that basis succeeded. Therefore, the rules on compensation for breach of 
pre-contractual duties is not well-developed within Norwegian law. It is however certain that 
the main rule is that compensation for the reliance interest may be claimed.125  
However, not all expenses occurred as a result of a pre-contractual breach are recoverable as 
compensation from the losing part. Within Norwegian law, there is a general requirement that 
the loss is adequate. Simonsen, however, points out that since the protection that 
compensation for breach of pre-contractual obligations offers generally can be tied to the 
aggrieved party's reasonable expectations, only loss-inducing acts that are motivated by such 
expectations are recoverable.126 If this reflects the applicable law, it involves a reduction in 
liability compared to what is recoverable according to the general rules of foreseeability; it is 
not normal to assess whether the loss of the breaching party was a result of reasonable 
expectations.127 The most typical losses that are included in 'reasonable expectations' are 
costs related to preparing proposals to be sent to the opposite party, expenses in connection 
with the negotiations itself, and money spent on re-examination and control with the other 
party's proposal's during the course of negotiations.128 
Simonsen further holds that the reliance interest is limited to whether the use of resources 
was reasonable, the situation of the aggrieved party taken into consideration. Such 
considerations were also highlighted in the Supreme Court case of Stiansen, where the court, 
despite the defendant’s pre-contractual breach, commented that the aggrieved party was not 
entitled to compensation for construction work commenced before the contract for such 
activity was concluded.129  
                                                 
125 Rt-1992-1110 (Stiansen), p. 1115-1116. 
126 Simonsen, p. 342-343. 
127 Although contributory negligence is possible under both Chinese and Norwegian law. 
128 Ibid., pp. 339-341. 
129 Rt-1992-1110, p. 1115. 
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Case law from the Swedish Supreme Court shows that where the duty to inform is not 
complied with, expenditures in reliance to received information is generally recoverable to a 
larger degree.130 The same consideration has been made by the Norwegian appellate court,131 
and Simonsen supports this view.132 
3.4.2 Expectation damages 
The Supreme Court of Norway has expressed that the expectation interest traditionally has 
not been recoverable as a loss suffered at the pre-contractual stage.133 Simonsen however 
holds that since pre-contractual situations vary so much, each case must be assessed on an 
individual basis.134 He mentions three factors that, especially combined, may serve as reason 
for getting covered the expectation interest at the pre-contractual stage. The first is whether 
the pre-contractual situation is of a nature equivalent to a contract, the second to increase the 
requirements for degree of probability, and the third to require a qualified breach of a pre-
contractual duty.135 He details, as an example, that a written record of a duty of exclusivity 
and a letter of intent with vague formulations normally will both be of a nature equivalent to 
a contract and will render it easier to prove a breach. He is therefore open to accepting 
compensation for the expectation interest in such cases.136 
The abovementioned cases from the Supreme Court were handed down after Simonsen 
presented his views and, in suggesting the current law, Simonsen puts weight to the fact that 
the question was unanswered by authoritative sources. The formulation in the cases are, 
however, that the performance interest "traditionally" has been considered as not being 
protected. The Supreme Court has therefore not excluded that compensation can be claimed 
for expectation damages at the pre-contractual stage. As the Supreme Court has not yet heard 
a case concerning the issue, it is however uncertain whether the factors which Simonsen 
advocates as grounds for awarding compensation for the expectation interest expresses the 
current law. 
                                                 
130 NJA 1963, p. 105. 
131 LB-2003-8482. 
132 Simonsen, p. 343. 
133 Rt-2007-425, section 32 and Rt-2010-1478, section 33. 
134 Simonsen, p. 359. 
135 Ibid. p. 359-361. 
136 Ibid. p. 362. 
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Where a party can be compensated for the expectation interest, Simonsen suggests operating 
with an intensified standard of proof and highlights that proving a causal link can be very 
challenging.137  
3.4.3 Indirect loss 
Traditionally, there has been some disagreement in the Nordic countries regarding whether a 
fault when contracting that leads to loss under the heading of 'loss of opportunity' either to 
contract with a third party or make alternative investments is covered.138 This position 
involves obtaining compensation for the expectation interest, whilst the expenses are actually 
a result of relying on activity made by the opposite party.  
The appellate court has given such compensation.139 The judgment was, however, based on 
the view of Simonsen, and although Simonsen leans towards the position that indirect loss of 
such nature is covered, he clearly states that the answer to the question is uncertain. The 
decision was further reviewed by the Supreme Court, who found that there was no pre-
contractual breach. The Supreme Court therefore did not need to review the part of the 
judgment from the lower court that dealt with the issue as to whether indirect loss is 
recoverable, and consequently did not discuss the issue. The appellate court's inaccurate 
reference to Simonsen combined with its failure to handle the liability issue correctly, still 
speaks to the fact that the argumentative value of the case is limited. 
If indirect loss may be covered, Simonsen holds that where there is a causal link between the 
acts or omissions of a breaching party and the aggrieved party's omission to enter into a 
losing bargain with a third party, the tortious party can, according to the rules on 
compensation, obtain relief for an amount equivalent to that which would have been lost had 
the aggrieved party entered into the losing bargain with the third party.140 
Whether the rules of causality are defined by the promise the aggrieved party reasonably has 
relied on or the general rules of causality is, according to Simonsen, uncertain. He also 
suggests that it might be a requirement that the contract negotiations objectively obstruct the 
                                                 
137 Simonsen, p. 363. 
138 Ibid. p. 346. 
139 LF-2005-28854 (Frostating) 
140 Simonsen, p. 349. 
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alternative agreement in order to fulfil the causality criteria.141 Suffice is to say that in the 
absence of any authoritative sources, the current law regarding causality for indirect loss is 
inconclusive. 
3.4.4 Comparative fault 
Where there is a pre-contractual breach, Norwegian law mainly seeks to protect the 
reasonable expectation and well-founded use of resources of the aggrieved party. The 
threshold for becoming liable is also high, which means that the aggrieved party will rarely 
be entitled to any compensation at all if it contributes to the breach. Because of the obvious 
conflict between being entitled to compensation and contributing to the loss, the second 
vote142 stated the following in the Supreme Court case of Malvik: "When the local council 
through its conduct has given the co-operative building society a reasonable expectation, in 
which it has acted in reliance to, there is no room for liability for contributory negligence".143 
144 
Simonsen is however of the view that liability for contributory negligence might be possible 
in some cases.145 He mentions three categories as examples. The first is where the breaching 
party has given misleading information that the aggrieved party has relied on and from an 
objective standard had reason to rely on but due to his individual qualifications should have 
understood was wrongful. Secondly, he considers the situation where the aggrieved party 
contributes to the breaching party's conduct. Here, such liability may also be imposed 
according to Simonsen. An example is where A and B negotiate, and A pulls out due to 
information given by B that was wrongfully perceived as negative, but B can be blamed for 
not expressing himself more clearly. Finally, Simonsen presents the situation where a party 
has reasonable grounds for relying on the opposite party's promise and as a result ends up 
making disproportionately large investments, and comments that the aggrieved party should 
bear the part of the loss which exceeds a proportionate investment.146  
                                                 
141 Simonsen p. 347. 
142 The second vote was a minority voter, but there was no express disagreement regarding this issue. 
143 Rt-1981-462, p. 476. 
144 My translation. 
145 Simonsen, pp. 287-300. 
146 Simonsen p. 291. 
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Despite the conflict between a party's reasonable expectations on acts or omissions performed 
by the opposing party and simultaneous contribution to the loss, the situations mentioned by 
Simonsen seems to be instances where these are compatible. The assessment to be carried out 
when deciding on whether compensation should be reduced as a result of contributory fault is 
described in Article 5-1 of the Act on Tort. Several Supreme Court decisions provide 
guidance to a detailed understanding of this Article. 
3.5 Equitable remedies under Norwegian law 
3.5.1 Specific performance 
As mentioned in subchapter 3.4.2, the expectation interest has within Norwegian law 
traditionally not enjoyed protection in the pre-contractual phase. According to the Supreme 
Court case of Aadalen, this is even more so in respect of specific performance.147 With the 
lack of any authoritative sources speaking to the contrary, it seems that there is no opening 
for such claims under Norwegian law. 
3.5.2 Unjust enrichment 
There are two situations that may serve as a basis for restitution of unjust enrichment. Firstly, 
enrichment resulting from activity by the party entitled to the information and, secondly, 
enrichment resulting from the other party's behaviour. 
The legal scholar Monsen has written an article in respect of the first situation, and after a 
thorough review of existing sources, he concluded that supply of considerable enrichment 
may function as a foundation for compensation to the extent that it is considered to be 
reasonable.148 Given the lack of any authoritative sources, the existence of such a narrow 
exemption as advocated by Monsen remains uncertain. 
Where the opposing party has actively acquired the enrichment, there are several 
circumstances in which statutory laws protects the aggrieved party. In cases of infringement 
                                                 
147 Rt-2010-1478, paragraph 33 
148 Erik Monsen, "Betalingskrav på berikelsesrettslig grunnlag i kjølvannet av havarerte kontraktsforhandlinger 
og som supplement til regler om pristillegg for tilleggs- og endringsarbeider, in Tidsskrift for forretningsjus, 
Volume 24, part 2 (2018) (pp. 159-190), subchapter 4.4.3. 
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of intellectual work as defined in the 2018 Copyright Act, the profit must be compensated in 
accordance with Article 81 first paragraph section c. Where a party has been trusted with a 
business secret or confidential technical information when conducting business and has 
unlawfully taken advantage of or copied the product of the other business, restitution can be 
claimed according to the 2009 Marketing Practices Act Article 48 b paragraph one section c).  
3.6 Comparative summary of the remedies 
Common to both Chinese and Norwegian laws is the fact that it is mainly only the reliance 
interest that can be compensated in the pre-contractual phase. With a minor exception in 
Chinese law,149 both legal systems require causality between the loss suffered and the act or 
omission that constituted a pre-contractual breach. While losses that are reasonably foreseen 
may be covered within Chinese law, only losses based on a party's reasonable expectations 
from the opposite party are likely to be recoverable under Norwegian law. Further, the loss is 
probably limited to reasonable use of resources in Norway, while no such restriction exists 
within Chinese law. In some cases, however, the amount of compensation for reliance 
damages will be limited to the size of the expectation interest in China. 
It is not generally considered possible to receive compensation for the expectation interest in 
China. However, there may be an opening for this in Norway, albeit limited to rare 
circumstances and a higher standard of proof.  
Chinese law leans towards the acceptance of the award of compensation for indirect loss, 
even though there is a disagreement concerning whether such loss may be recovered. Indirect 
loss is also likely to be recoverable in Norway and, with regard to the rules of causality, 
uncertainty prevails as to whether it is the general rules of causality or the promise the 
aggrieved party reasonable has relied on that is applicable. Further, there might be a 
requirement that the conduct of the breaching party objectively has obstructed a conclusion of 
the alternative agreement. 
While comparative fault undoubtedly is relevant for measuring losses resulting from a pre-
contractual breach within Chinese law, Norwegian law has been more sceptical towards 
operating with such a rule. It however seems that the objection against it is that it is 
                                                 
149 The bidding expenditures that would be incurred independent of the pre-contractual breach. 
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practically impossible. It is therefore likely to be accepted in the situations presented by 
Simonsen.  
With regard to specific performance, Chinese law operates with the peculiar variant that 
substituted specific performance can be claimed when a party which was supposed to apply 
for approval or registration under the agreement fails to do so. On the other hand, Norwegian 
law does not accept specific performance at the pre-contractual stage at all. 
There is no legal basis in the CCL for restitution on the basis of unjust enrichment where the 
breaching party has played a passive role while receiving enrichment. Whether there is a 
small opening for this within Norwegian law, is uncertain. Unjust enrichment can, however, 
be claimed for the active unjustified acquirement within both legal systems. 
Although the main characteristics to a large degree are the same when it comes to remedies 
for breach of pre-contractual duties within Chinese and Norwegian law, there seem to be 
many differences on closer analysis. A lot of the legal rules in respect of remedies for pre-
contractual liability are, at least on a detailed level, inconclusive in both legal systems. 
A possibly very different regulation between China and Norway is the remoteness issue in the 
pre-contractual phase. While case law from Chinese courts seem to accept wide-ranging 
liability when pre-contractual obligations are not complied with, the existing legal sources in 
Norway speaks to the fact that stricter rules on causality applies. A consequence is that the 
potential size of the amount that the breaching party may be answerable for compensating, is 
greater within Chinese law than is the case pursuant to Norwegian law. 
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4 Certain important features of the 
Chinese legal system and culture that 
influence the practical application of the 
doctrine of pre-contractual liability 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to conduct a meaningful analysis of how the doctrine of pre-contractual liability in 
China is to be understood in practice, it is fundamental to address certain characteristic 
features of the Chinese legal system and culture which to a large degree influence the 
practical applicability of the doctrine. 
4.2 Unpredictable dispute resolution 
4.2.1 Political influence 
In most civilised legal systems, state power is divided into three branches; namely the 
legislature, executive and judiciary. This concept is known as separation of powers and 
serves the purpose of preventing abuse of power through the three branches' checks and 
balances towards each other. 
In China, the National People's Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (NPC) is the 
national legislature. The very same body is also placed above both the executive and 
judiciary in the hierarchy of powers. Consequently, there is no separation of powers in the 
shape of the three above mentioned branches in China.150 The president of China and general 
secretary of the Party, Xi Jinping, in fact said in a speech made on August 24th 2018 that 
"[China] must never follow the path of Western constitutionalism, separation of powers, or 
                                                 
150 This is even laid down in Article 57 of the 2018 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (the 
Constitution). See in particular Articles 62, 63 and 133 as examples on how the NPC is on top of the hierarchy 
of powers.    
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judicial independence".151 It may however be difficult to grasp how the relationship between 
the CCP and the judiciary exactly operates in practice, and the topic has been widely debated 
among Chinese scholars.152 I will limit this exposition to a few undisputable facts. 
In order to enhance their career or even maintain their position, judges have to demonstrate 
complete loyalty to the Party; the CCP is responsible for the appointment, removal and 
rotation of top officials of the judiciary and the executive.153 154 The judges further receive 
their salary from the local governments, which is assumed to leave them in a state of 
dependence.155 The CCP will also participate in the handling and even decision of specific 
cases.156 
Furthermore, Chinese society is very dynamic, and the political system is extremely efficient 
in carrying out desired goals. Therefore, political changes happen very rapidly, particularly in 
respect of new regulations and instructions towards the judiciary from the Party. Combined 
with the fact that the SPC's decisions do not carry any precedent and that laws often are 
formulated in a vague manner so that the Party has a wide discretion in instructing the courts 
on a case-by-case basis, the legal system is markedly unpredictable.157 
4.2.2 Local protectionism 
The political influence on court decisions can easily result in private companies and 
especially foreign companies becoming victim of local protectionism. Research shows that if 
the plaintiff has a residence which coincides with the court's, it will generally have an 
                                                 
151 Charlotte Gao, (2019, February 19). Xi: China Must Never Adopt Constitutionalism, Separation of Powers, 
or Judicial Independence. The Diplomat, Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/xi-china-must-never-
adopt-constitutionalism-separation-of-powers-or-judicial-independence/  
152 For a detailed account, see Ling Li, "The Chinese Communist Party and People's Courts: Judicial 
Dependence in China", in The American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 64, Issue 1, 1 March 2016, pp. 
37-74. 
153 Mei Ying Gechlik, (2003, October 29). The Chinese Communist Party's Leadership and Judicial 
Independence. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2003/10/29/chinese-communist-party-s-leadership-and-judicial-independence-
event-650 
154 See as examples Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. 
155 Thomas Lagerqvist & Ulf Ohrling, Quotations from a China Practice, second edition, Stockholm 2015, p. 
94. 
156 Despite Article 126 of the Constitution laying down that the people's courts are independent, Article 128 
speaks clearly to the contrary, and there is no doubt that there is a de facto interference in practice.  
https://carnegieendowment.org/2003/10/29/chinese-communist-party-s-leadership-and-judicial-independence-
event-650 
157 Lagerqvist/Ohrling, p 103. 
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increased possibility of succeeding with the litigation158. Private companies are also 
frequently discriminated against to the advantage of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).159 This 
is especially so in rural areas and in less developed provinces. Such discrimination can 
however also take place in more developed areas such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen.160 
4.2.3 Local differences 
China is the world's most populous country and the fourth largest by area. In many ways, 
China is in fact more a continent than a country. Its combined size is more than double that of 
all EU-countries combined, with each province the size of a European country and more than 
forty spoken languages and distinct regional differences.161 This divergence in local policies 
between various regions and the difference in the judges' cultural background and thereby 
premises for understanding the law, results in local differences in how laws are applied. This 
makes dispute resolution unpredictable. 
4.3 Chinese culture 
4.3.1 Guanxi 
Despite the above-mentioned factors that make China a diversified country, the vast majority 
of the people share the same core cultural values. Among these are the concept of guanxi, 
which literally means "relationships". In the Chinese business environment, the concept 
refers to a network of relationships consisting of various parties that cooperate and support 
each other.162 Within the network, favours are exchanged regularly and voluntarily in a 
reciprocally proportional manner.163  
Since such a network is often crucial in order to succeed with a business in China, such as in 
obtaining permits, partners or investors, developing and maintaining it requires great focus. 
                                                 
158 Cheryl Xiaoning Long & Jun Wang, "Judicial local protectionism in China: An empirical study of IP cases", 
in International Review of Law and Economics, Volume 42, June 2015, pp. 48-59, chapter 1. 
159 Lagerqvist/Ohrling, p. 93. 
160 Ibid. p. 93-94. 
161 Ibid. p. 26. 
162 Ibid. p. 51. 
163 Ibid. 
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While resorting to litigation generally will be acceptable among professional parties in the 
Nordic countries, this is not the case in China.164 The interpersonal relationship in the form of 
guanxi, which served as a prerequisite for collaborating in the first place, will then break. A 
consequence of this is that many businesses will refrain from initiating court proceedings 
over disputes with a business partner with whom they intend to do business in the future. The 
formal laws on pre-contractual liability are therefore largely without significance in many 
situations because the norms that have been developed within the parties' guanxi are decisive 
for what is regarded as acceptable conduct when negotiating a contract. 
4.4 Comparison with Norwegian legal system and culture 
Separation of powers is considered to be one of the main principles the Norwegian legal 
system is based upon.165 The division appears from The Constitution of 1814; the government 
is according to Article 3 the executive, the people according to Article 49 the legislature, 
whilst the courts according to Article 88 are the judiciary. There is consequently no 
acceptance towards political influence on court decisions in Norway, and the judges are 
considered to be fully independent and impartial. Local protectionism is neither considered to 
be a problem within Norwegian law. Despite the existence of cultural differences, these are 
much more limited than in China, and no voices has advocated that they affect legal 
reasoning in a way that makes dispute resolution in Norway unpredictable. 
Although the principle of guanxi does not have a Norwegian equivalent, relationships are 
naturally of significance when it comes to choosing business partners also in Norway. An 
important difference however lays in whether the business relationship will survive a 
litigation. Even though going to court in itself or consequences such proceedings bears with it 
may indeed result in dissolution of a partnership in Norway, taking legal actions is to a large 
degree accepted within Norwegian business culture. If the parties fail to agree, a court of law 
is considered to have both high proficiency in applying the law and to offer a trustful dispute 
resolution.166 When it is the law the parties disagree on, courts are consequently considered to 
be well-placed in deciding which one of the parties that were "right", and their business 
                                                 
164 Ibid. p. 103. 
165 Although Norway has a parliamentary system. 
166 Iwar Arnstand (2018). Stabilt høy tiltro til domstolene. In Rett på sak, volume 4, pp. 4-5. 
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relationship will often continue in a well-functioning manner after the judgment has been 
delivered. 
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5 Comparative summary 
The above chapters have identified the main differences and similarities of the law of pre-
contractual liability in China and Norway and given an account of certain important features 
of the Chinese legal system influencing how the doctrine is applied in practice. This chapter 
will summarize the findings the comparison has resulted in. 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I mentioned the different approaches taken by common and 
civil law jurisdictions towards pre-contractual liability. Both Chinese and Norwegian law has 
taken the approach of the latter, and the doctrine of pre-contractual liability is consequently 
applied in both countries. 
 
However, the law of pre-contractual liability is not particularly developed within either legal 
system. Although the main concepts and starting points are indisputable, the two jurisdictions 
offer a limited number of authoritative sources; both in relation to which general factors that 
are relevant and their weight, and whether various types of behaviour are acceptable or not 
when negotiating. It also concerns whether general tort law principles are applicable to the 
remedy assessment, or if special rules apply. 
 
The limited number of authoritative sources does not mean, however, that there is nothing to 
be said about the relationship between the Chinese and Norwegian law of pre-contractual 
liability. Except for the specific situations that are regulated separately in China, the starting 
point for the liability assessment, in both legal systems, consists of a general formulation that 
encompasses a large variety of bad faith behaviour. Furthermore, a common fundamental 
requirement for imposing liability is that fault, meaning either intent or negligence, must have 
been shown in breaching the pre-contractual obligation. The general basis for assessing 
whether a person is at fault is also of similar nature. In China, the key test is whether the 
defendant's behaviour falls below what is expected of a reasonable person on the basis of the 
moral, social and commercial standards of conduct prevailing in the community concerned. 
Similarly, according to Norwegian law, the test is whether the party has acted as would a 
reasonable person of ordinary prudence have done, with regards taken to the respective area 
of life in which the conduct takes place. 
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The presentation of certain relevant types of situations in chapter 2 of this thesis, further 
supported that Chinese and Norwegian law in many types of situations bear similarity. Some 
of the instances appeared to be different but were actually similar in practice. The additional 
requirement that the entitled person in China must take reasonable measures to protect the 
secrecy of the information in situations as described in subchapter 2.5, is, for instance, 
unlikely to involve any significant difference compared to Norwegian law. Other rules 
seemed dissimilar because of systematic difference; the law of pre-contractual liability has 
more of an individual status as a legal doctrine in China and can function in concurrence with 
general tort and contract law. In Norway, however, there is no such overlap. Situations as 
described in chapter 2.7 about duty to apply for approval or registration may, for instance, not 
be placed under the category of pre-contractual liability in Norway, but similar rules within 
general contract law are applicable.  
 
Although the topic of assessments is often formulated in the same way, many of the 
discretionary assessments that must be carried out, both concerning the starting point for the 
basis of liability and the application of the law to various types of situations, will often lead to 
different results. One reason is simply the fact that the cultural norms and values in the two 
countries differ. Also, a more unified comprehension of what is reasonable conduct when 
negotiating is likely to be based on people's common perception in Norway. In China, 
however, the view on what is considered acceptable behaviour when negotiating depends on 
the geographical location of the court handling the case. Political influence and the existence 
of local protectionism are other factors making application of the law unpredictable.  
 
To summarize, although the assessments that must be carried out when considering the basis 
of liability is similar in China and Norway, the result of the assessment is expected to differ 
in many cases. And while the perception of the norm for acceptable behaviour is expected to 
be fairly unified in Norway,167 Chinese law is less predictable.  
 
The fact that the amount of authoritative legal sources concerning the rules on pre-contractual 
liability within Chinese and Norwegian law is limited, also affects how clarified the rules on 
remedial consequences are. The general principles related to remedies for breach of contract 
are however well-developed in both jurisdictions, and these will be applied at the pre-
                                                 
167 See also Simonsen, p. 218. 
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contractual stage to the extent that they are considered fit. As shown in subchapter 3.6, there 
seem to be many differences between the countries on a detail level. A possibly large 
difference concerns the causality requirement; Norwegian law is expected to reduce the 
possible extent of responsibility compared to general tort law principles, whilst Chinese law 
adopts its general tort law. Despite the loss suffered being the same, the aggrieved party may 
consequently enjoy better protection under Chinese law than what is the case under 
Norwegian law. This may especially be so concerning indirect loss.  
 
The features highlighted in chapter 4 of this thesis is likely to entail that Chinese courts, in 
some instances, also will apply the rules on remedies as they consider appropriate. An 
illustrative example is the case where the plaintiff was compensated for its bidding costs 
although this expense would be incurred regardless of the pre-contractual breach. 
 
To summarize, Chinese and Norwegian law are similar in that they both adopt many general 
tort law principles to the pre-contractual stage. However, Chinese courts seem to impose a 
larger variety of remedial consequences than Norwegian courts and recover greater losses, 
which means that the potential consequences of a pre-contractual breach are greater in China. 
 
The current law of pre-contractual liability is not expected to change in the near future in any 
of the two legal systems. In Norway, the non-statutory nature of the doctrine is expected to 
remain, and the Supreme Court hears a very limited number of cases regarding this doctrine. 
The development will hence happen slowly. However, the progress of the law of pre-
contractual liability is expected to move even slower in China. The many unclarified details 
are possibly a result of a desire to retain a wide discretion so that the authorities may execute 
political power in an effective manner. Ensuring local and state interests will, after all, be 
easier within the frame of such a norm. Moreover, if detailed rules are given in China, 
unpredictability will nevertheless prevail as long as the features of the Chinese legal system 
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Ot.prp. nr. 3 (1976-1977) Ot.prp.nr.3 (1976-1977) Om lov om endringer i lov 10 februar 1967 
om behandlingsmåten i forvaltningssaker (regler om taushetsplikt m. 
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In chronological order 
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